June 2026 has solidified a sharp divide between the European Union and its Eastern flank. In just one week, Ukraine and Moldova have reached a milestone that had been blocked for almost two years, while Georgia, hailed as an “inspiring leader” among Eastern Partnership nations, continued to languish in a state of self-imposed isolation. The differences of these three candidate countries provide a valuable lesson on the mechanics of EU enlargement and on the impact of geopolitical alignment, domestic politics, and democratic commitment on a country’s European future.
A Historic Breakthrough – For Two?
On 15 June 2026, under the Cypriot Council presidency, the European Union formally launched the first cluster of accession negotiations, the cluster on “Fundamentals” with Ukraine and Moldova (Council of the EU, 2026). The most important cluster in the accession process is the cluster of the rule of law, fundamental rights, functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform, and economic criteria. It is the first open and the last closed, and thus its progress sets the pace for all others (European Commission, 2026a).
It was a long time coming. The formal launch of the cluster talks had been blocked in Hungary since 2024 due to concerns about the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region. The deadlock only ended when Viktor Orbán’s government collapsed in the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections in April. Within weeks, new Prime Minister Péter Magyar negotiated a deal with Kyiv, allowing Budapest to remove its veto (Al Jazeera, 2026). The speed was remarkable: Magyar himself noted that his government had achieved in three weeks what the previous administration had failed to accomplish in ten years (New Union Post, 2026a).
It was a very symbolic and practical moment for Ukraine. The negotiations on accession are conducted in six thematic clusters, while the remaining ones cannot be finalized until the benchmarks of Cluster 1 (Time, 2026) are fulfilled. In September 2025, Ukraine had already gone through the EU bilateral screening process and had adopted a national program to implement the EU acquis. Some chapters may be closed as early as 2026, and the Accession Treaty might be drawn up and signed in 2027 (New Union Post, 2026b). On 1 January 2026, Ukraine also became part of the EU’s roaming area, which represents a concrete advantage for citizens (Council of the EU, n.d.). There may be some resistance to the idea of progress, but it is real.
Moldova’s trajectory is even more interesting, especially in the context of the small country’s limited resources. Chișinău has quietly built up a good reform record, having gone through its own screening process in September 2025 and having in place 28 out of 30 reforms required under the EU’s Growth Plan, securing €504 million in disbursements to date (New Union Post, 2026c). At the EU-Moldova Summit on 22 June 2026, Commission President von der Leyen made it clear: “When a candidate country performs the way Moldova does…, it deserves to move on. A merit-based process is not a slow process, it is a fair process” (Euronews, 2026). Since then, Moldavian President Maia Sandu has urged the remaining five clusters to be opened up right away, calling it a race against time (New Union Post, 2026c).
A major issue now on the table for both countries is whether Moldova should be separated from Ukraine’s path to accession. The two bids have been tied since 2022, and it was a political decision, based on the logic of the Eastern Partnership. The formal process, which is currently underway, calls for different reforms at different speeds, however. EU officials have started to recognize that there is a possibility for decoupling (Euronews, 2026). For Moldova, a country at peace, with a long-term goal of joining a pro-European country and a consistently pro-European government, this adds unnecessary delay to its path to joining a country still engaged in conflict.
Georgia’s Frozen Path
Georgia shows the opposite scenario. The country was granted EU candidate status in December 2023, together with Ukraine and Moldova, and has experienced a “serious democratic backsliding, with a fast deterioration of the rule of law and fundamental rights” (European Commission, 2025). The ruling Georgian Dream party, which is supported by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, enacted a foreign agents law similar to the one adopted by Russia and implemented other broad anti-LGBTQ+ measures while also orchestrating a parliamentary election in October 2024 that international observers described as neither free nor fair (RFE/RL, 2025).
The results were immediate. In November 2024, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would suspend its EU accession process until 2028, sparking the largest wave of street protests since Georgian independence (Wikipedia, 2026a). The European Parliament passed a resolution that condemned the election results and requested new elections (European Parliament, 2025). In March 2026, the European Commission (EEAS) applied the new visa suspension mechanism for the first time, cancelling visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic, service, and official passports. It is in effect until March 2027 and can be expanded and spread to the Georgian people if the situation gets worse. EU Commissioner Magnus Brunner said simply, “There is no room for anyone who is a representative of repression in our Union” (Washington Times, 2026).
Further, in the Commission’s 2025 report, Georgian candidate status was called “only on paper” (EU Neighbours East, 2025). This is not just a matter of rhetoric: Georgia has not done anything of the nine reform steps that are needed for the start of accession negotiations. Opposition leaders have been arrested, independent media have been attacked, and civil society groups have had their bank accounts blocked for alleged protest activities (Human Rights Watch, 2026). According to a survey conducted early in 2026, a majority of Georgians (71%) still wish to be a member of the EU, but their own government is holding them captive (Wikipedia, 2026b).
What This Divergence Reveals
What Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova have in common is a stark lesson about the process of enlargement: it is based on the act of commitment, not the word. Georgia’s government professes to support EU membership in principle but systematically undermines the democratic structures and processes required to join the EU. Ukraine is in a full-scale war and is taking measures to implement judicial reforms and conform to the EU acquis in conditions none of the previous candidates have faced. In the face of intense Russian geopolitical pressure, Moldova has met its reform targets regularly.
The Eastern Flank divergence also has a wider message for the EU’s instruments of influence. If applied rigorously, the merit-based enlargement process gives genuine incentives for reform. But it can also be used: the government can be frozen in place, it can take the sanctions into its stride, and it can claim victimhood status and still have the nominal status of having the status of a candidate. The issue for Brussels is whether a ‘candidate country in name only’ should always stay in that category or whether there is a need for clearer-cut criteria for suspension.
What the future of the Eastern Partnership in Europe looks like was demonstrated in June 2026. The way to Brussels is now officially open for two of its members. For the third, it hasn’t started yet.
References
Al Jazeera. (2026, June 12). EU agrees launch of accession process for Ukraine and Moldova. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/12/eu-agrees-launch-of-accession-process-for-ukraine-and-moldova
Council of the EU. (2026, June 15). EU and Ukraine open first accession negotiations cluster. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/06/15/eu-and-ukraine-open-first-accession-negotiations-cluster/
Council of the EU. (n.d.). Ukraine. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/ukraine/
EEAS. (2026, March 6). Commission suspends visa-free travel for Georgian holders of diplomatic, service or official passports under the revised Visa Suspension Mechanism. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/commission-suspends-visa-free-travel-georgian-holders-diplomatic-service-or-official-passports-under_en
EU Neighbours East. (2025, November 7). European Commission says Georgia “a candidate country in name only”. https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/european-commission-says-georgia-a-candidate-country-in-name-only/
Euronews. (2026, June 22). EU sets stage for decoupling Moldova’s accession bid from Ukraine’s. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/22/eu-sets-stage-for-decoupling-moldovas-accession-bid-from-ukraines
European Commission. (2025). Georgia 2025 enlargement report. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/countries/georgia_en
European Commission. (2026a). EU and Ukraine open first accession negotiations cluster. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-ukraine-open-first-accession-negotiations-cluster-2026-06-15_en
European Parliament. (2025, September 7). Parliament deplores the democratic backsliding and repression in Georgia. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250704IPR29451/parliament-deplores-the-democratic-backsliding-and-repression-in-georgia
Human Rights Watch. (2026). World report 2026: Georgia. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/georgia
New Union Post. (2026a, June 4). EU accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova are almost ready. https://newunionpost.eu/2026/06/04/work-eu-accession-talks-ukraine-moldova/
New Union Post. (2026b, April 22). Ukraine aims to close EU accession chapters already in 2026. https://newunionpost.eu/2026/04/22/ukraine-eu-accession-chapters-2026/
New Union Post. (2026c, June 22). EU–Moldova Summit overshadowed by uncertainty over accession. https://newunionpost.eu/2026/06/22/eu-moldova-summit-accession-clusters/
RFE/RL. (2025, November 3). EU report slams Georgia for democratic backsliding, highlights progress in other candidates. https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-report-slams-georgia-democratic-backsliding-progress-candidates/33580249.html
Time. (2026, June 15). Ukraine is a step closer to joining the European Union. Here’s what to know. https://time.com/article/2026/06/15/ukraine-joining-the-european-union-membership-process-negotiations-status/
Washington Times. (2026, March 6). EU suspends visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials over democratic backsliding. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/mar/6/eu-suspends-visa-free-travel-georgian-diplomats-officials-democratic/
